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UNITED STATES V. SCHIFF: COMMERCIAL SPEECH
REGULATION OR FREE SPEECH INFRINGEMENT?
Jacqueline K. Hall ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 9, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the
1
Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction issued by the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada prohibiting Irwin
Schiff and two of his associates from selling his book, The Federal Mafia: How the Government Illegally Imposes and Unlawfully Collects Income
2
Taxes. In agreeing that the over three-hundred page book could be
regulated and suppressed as commercial speech, the Ninth Circuit
denied Schiff his freedom of speech guaranteed under the First
3
Amendment.
The Federal Mafia is the latest book in a series of works on federal
4
income tax written by Schiff, a 77-year-old avid anti-tax proponent.
The book contains, among other things, extensive criticism of the
5
methods the federal government employs in collecting income tax.
For example, in condemning the government’s use of a “Notice of
Levy” to seize funds to pay off tax debt, Schiff writes:
∗

J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2003, The
College of New Jersey. The author would like to thank Jeff Mazzola for his guidance
on this project.
1
United States v. Schiff (Schiff II), 379 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2004).
2
IRWIN SCHIFF, THE FEDERAL MAFIA: HOW THE GOVERNMENT ILLEGALLY IMPOSES
AND UNLAWFULLY COLLECTS INCOME TAXES (1990).
3
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 630 (“Because we can uphold the injunction as an appropriate restriction on fraudulent commercial speech, we do not need to address the
alternate bases cited by the district court to support the injunction . . . .”).
4
See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at back cover. Schiff’s other books include HOW AN
ECONOMY GROWS AND WHY IT DOESN’T (1985); HOW ANYONE CAN STOP PAYING INCOME
TAXES (1982); THE BIGGEST CON: HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS FLEECING YOU (1977); THE
GREAT INCOME TAX HOAX: WHY YOU CAN IMMEDIATELY STOP PAYING THIS ILLEGALLY
ENFORCED TAX (1985); THE SOCIAL SECURITY SWINDLE: HOW ANYONE CAN DROP OUT
(1984). His latest video seminar is SECRETS TO LIVING AN INCOME TAX FREE LIFE
(1999). His tax packets, consisting of documents and taped materials, include “The
Lien and Levy Package” and “The Audit Package.” SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 319–20.
5
See, e.g., id. at 98.
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[I]n resorting to such trickery and extortion, is the government
breaking any laws? The answer is no. The government, remember, wrote into the law its right to seize property “by any means.”
So the government apparently feels it has a legal right to get its
money by extortion, bribery, mail and wire fraud, under false pretenses and in ways that are generally not available to the rest of us.
So, as you can see, the only real distinction between the federal
government and the Mafia is that the government really has a li6
cense to steal, the Mafia doesn’t.

In addition, the book details Schiff’s long history of tax protesting,
including the various jail sentences he has served in connection with
7
tax evasion. Throughout The Federal Mafia, Schiff refers to other
books and reports he has written and published through Freedom
Books, the publishing company he operates with the help of his asso8
Furthermore, to support his interpretation of the laws
ciates.
concerning payment of income tax, Schiff repeatedly quotes specific
language from the Internal Revenue Code sections he interprets, and
he uses excerpts from court cases and works by other authors to
9
strengthen his arguments.
At the heart of The Federal Mafia lie Schiff’s contentions that the
payment of income tax is voluntary and thus the collection of income
10
tax is unconstitutional. According to Schiff, a compulsory income
11
tax would violate the taxing clauses of the Constitution. Schiff contends that the United States government, realizing the
unconstitutionality of a compulsory tax, has based its collection of in12
come tax revenues on a system of “voluntary compliance.” Schiff
states that no Internal Revenue Code section makes one liable for
6

Id. at 152.
Id. at 239. Schiff has served at least thirty months in prison. Id. at 256. On October 24, 2005, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada found
Schiff guilty of charges including conspiracy, tax evasion, and tax fraud. Schiff could
receive up to 43 years in prison in sentencing scheduled for January 20, 2006. Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Professional Tax Resister Irwin Schiff and Two Associates Convicted in Las Vegas Tax Scam (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/opa/pr/2005/October/05_tax_548.html.
8
See, e.g., SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 60 nn.1–2 (referring reader to SCHIFF, THE
SOCIAL SECURITY SWINDLE: HOW ANYONE CAN DROP OUT (1984) for “some really outrageous examples” of the public accepting what government and professional tax
preparers tell them); id. at 97 n.6 (referring reader to SCHIFF, THE GREAT INCOME TAX
HOAX (1985) for more on how federal judges make “a total mockery out of the
American jury system”).
9
See, e.g., id. at 18, 55, 61.
10
Id. at 20.
11
Id. at 20 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4).
12
Id. at 11.
7
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13

paying income tax; therefore, according to Schiff, one should be
able to legally claim on a W-4 form that he or she is “exempt” from
14
tax liability. Although Schiff provides detailed instructions on how
to respond to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) forms to avoid a tax liability that, in his view, does not exist, Schiff also warns readers of the
consequences of such a response:
When you get your Questionnaire, you will have to decide how to
answer it. Since you will be dealing with a criminal government
that acts in arbitrary and unpredictable ways, you will have to respond based upon that understanding, in conjunction with the
15
knowledge you acquired through this book.

Schiff further notes in relation to claiming “exempt,” or filing a “zeroincome” tax return:
So, you may find that even though you correctly responded to the
IRS’s inquiry, you might still be fined $500.00 for filing an “incorrect W-4.” Your employer might be “directed” to disregard your
W-4 and to withhold even more taxes than would otherwise be the
case. Your employer might also be “directed” to take both the
fine and the larger tax payments (that you also don’t owe) out of
your pay.
AND THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF
AMERICAN EMPLOYERS WILL DO JUST THAT! In addition,
your government is now using W-4s upon which individuals have
validly claimed “exempt” as evidence of an affirmative act of tax
evasion and prosecutes and imprisons people accordingly! All of
this is happening because the American public (with a magnificent assist from the media) has allowed this nation to degenerate
into a neo-fascist state where neither law nor the Constitution
16
holds much interest for either the government or its courts.

Such attacks on the United States government color almost every
17
page of The Federal Mafia.
The First Amendment to the Constitution declares “Congress
18
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Included
within the First Amendment is the right, venerated by Thomas Jefferson in his Inaugural Address, to speak critically of the government:
“If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or
change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monu-

13
14
15
16
17
18

SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 11.
Id. at 154–55.
Id. at 155–57.
Id. at 157.
See SCHIFF, supra note 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated
19
where reason is left free to combat it.”
The United States Supreme Court has at times interpreted the
First Amendment broadly, and as Justice Brandeis explained: “even
advocacy of [law] violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a
justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of
incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would
20
be immediately acted on.” The courts have treated Schiff’s views
with varying degrees of seriousness, and have labeled them “legally
21
22
frivolous” and “knowingly false.”
Regardless of the legitimacy of Schiff’s position on taxes, however, on August 9, 2004, the Ninth Circuit denied Irwin Schiff his
23
right to free speech.
In announcing that The Federal Mafia was
commercial speech and regulating it as such, the Ninth Circuit may
have been focusing not on the First Amendment, what it meant to
our founding fathers, and how it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, but rather on information collected by the IRS,
indicating that almost 5,000 zero-income returns, representing an estimated $56 million in attempted tax evasion, were filed by nearly
3,100 of Schiff’s followers during a three-year period from approxi24
mately 2000–2003.
Accordingly, this Comment supports the position that the Ninth
Circuit erred in deciding that The Federal Mafia is properly regulated
as commercial speech. First, this Comment briefly traces the histories
of political speech and commercial speech protections. The Comment then summarizes Schiff I and Schiff II before analyzing the cases
and concluding that that The Federal Mafia is political speech entitled
to full First Amendment protection.
II. POLITICAL SPEECH
Political speech, including criticism of the government, occupies
25
the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment. As the
26
Court in Mills v. Alabama stated:
19

President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/11.htm.
20
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
21
United States v. Schiff (Schiff I), 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1269 n.3 (D. Nev. 2003).
22
Id. at 1269.
23
See United States v. Schiff (Schiff II), 379 F.3d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 2004).
24
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. at 1268.
25
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (holding a statute prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature an unconstitutional
violation of the First Amendment).
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Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in
which government is operated or should be operated, and all
such matters relating to political processes. The Constitution
specifically selected the press, which includes . . . newspapers,
books, and magazines . . . to play an important role in the discus27
sion of public affairs.

The Court similarly extolled the virtues of free speech in Terminiello v.
28
City of Chicago, stating that government remains responsive to the
will of the people “only through free debate and free exchange of
29
ideas.” Thus, the Court declared, “[T]he right to speak freely and
to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the
30
chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.” The
Terminiello Court further noted that one of the functions of “provoca31
tive and challenging” free speech is to invite dispute. In fact, the
Court opined that free speech is best serving “its high purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with condi32
tions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.” Furthermore, the
Court observed that free speech, while serving its laudable purpose,
may also “strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound
33
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.” The Court
has additionally justified free political speech, declaring that “[t]he
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
34
changes desired by the people.” Most importantly, the right to criticize the government is “the heart of what the First Amendment is
35
meant to protect.”
26

384 U.S. 214 (1966) (holding a statute criminalizing the publishing of an editorial urging people to vote for a certain candidate in public election a violation of
the First Amendment).
27
Id. at 218–19 (citation omitted).
28
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
29
Id. at 4 (citing De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding obscenity not constitutionally protected).
35
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (addressing campaign finance reform;
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The Court has thus recognized that “speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self36
government.” The Court has also recognized that the high value of
37
free speech can often lead those in power to seek to suppress it.
Free speech and expression therefore have special significance with
respect to government because “[it] is here that the state has a special
incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective
38
power of suppression.” The Supreme Court has acknowledged “the
39
fundamental freedoms of speech and press,” declaring that “[t]he
door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left
ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack
necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important inter40
ests.”
To avoid burdening core political speech, a strict scrutiny test is
applied to restrictions on political speech, such that a restriction is
upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state in41
terest. Failing to apply such a strict standard in suppressing speech
could “lead to standardization of ideas either by the legislatures,
42
courts, or dominant political or community groups.” The Court has
also asserted that political speech must be protected regardless of
43
whether it has the intended effect on the audience. In fact, the
Court has held that “[u]rgent, important, and effective speech can be
no less protected than impotent speech, lest the right to speak be
44
relegated to those instances when it is least needed.”
Instead of suppressing speech, then, the Court has been apt to
open the channels of communication to allow Americans to form

prohibiting in part corporate and national-party use of money to fund campaign
ads).
36
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
37
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)) (observing “[s]elf-government
suffers when those in power suppress competing views on public issues from diverse
and antagonistic sources”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
38
Id. at 777 n.11 (citations omitted).
39
Roth, 354 U.S. at 488.
40
Id.
41
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
42
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949).
43
See id.
44
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (citation omitted) (holding a statute prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature violated a speaker’s First Amendment
rights).
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their own judgments in making informed choices. President Woodrow Wilson justified free speech on these grounds, stating:
I have always been among those who believed that the greatest
freedom of speech was the greatest safety, because if a man is a
fool, the best thing to do is to encourage him to advertise the fact
by speaking. It cannot be so easily discovered if you allow him to
remain silent and look wise, but if you let him speak, the secret is
out and the world knows that he is a fool. So it is by the exposure
of folly that it is defeated; not by the seclusion of folly, and in this
free air of free speech men get into that sort of communication
with one another which constitutes the basis of all common
46
achievement.

Such rhetoric may lead one to believe that the government has always
venerated free speech and has never denied Americans the right to
speak out or hear speech criticizing the government. It should be
noted, however, that throughout American history, the Supreme
Court, often during politically tense times, has altered its approach to
47
protecting speech critical of the United States. During World War I
and the McCarthy era, for instance, the Court morphed the standards
for protecting political speech, and allowed restrictions on speech
48
that may not have been upheld during less turbulent times.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH PROTECTION
A. What Constitutes Commercial Speech?
Although political speech is often touted as receiving full First
49
Amendment protection, courts have at times restricted even this
50
On the other hand, courts have never afforded
type of speech.

45

See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
46
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 36 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting President Woodrow
Wilson, Address at the Institute of France (May 10, 1919)).
47
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.3.2
(2d ed. 2002).
48
See id.; see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding convictions for teaching books written by Josef Stalin, Karl Marx, Frederic Engels, and
Vladimir Lenin); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding a conviction
for attending a Communist Labor Party meeting in violation of state syndicalism
law); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding a conviction for publishing
“Left Wing Manifesto” in violation of statute prohibiting advocacy of overthrowing
government); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding a conviction
for circulating leaflet arguing that draft violated Thirteenth Amendment).
49
See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
50
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, at § 11.3.2.
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commercial speech full First Amendment protection. Courts have
explained the rationale for treating commercial speech differently
than political speech by citing the differences between the types of
52
speech. Commercial speech, according to the Supreme Court, is
more objective and factual than political speech, and its truth is more
53
easily verifiable. Moreover, as commercial speech is linked to com54
mercial profits, it is considered hardier and thus less easily chilled.
Exactly what constitutes “commercial speech,” however, remains
55
vague. In fact, the Court has admitted that “the precise bounds of
the category of expression that may be termed commercial speech”
56
are subject to doubt.
The Court has further admitted that the
commercial speech doctrine relies on “the ‘common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction . . . and
57
other varieties of speech.”
The United States Supreme Court offered a clear and narrow
definition in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con58
sumer Council, Inc., stating that commercial speech is expression that
59
“propose[s] a commercial transaction.” Price and quantity informa60
tion, for example, fit into this definition of commercial speech.
The Court expanded the limits of “commercial speech” from
mere price advertising into a broader yet less workable definition in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
61
York. The Court held that commercial speech is “expression related
62
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”
Three years later, the Court addressed the scope of the Central Hud51

See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995) (observing that
some restrictions on commercial speech are tolerated given the nature of such
speech).
52
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 (1976).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1223 (1983).
56
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (holding
an attorney may not be disciplined for soliciting legal business in a truthful, nondeceptive printed advertisement).
57
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (upholding
Ohio’s imposition of discipline on an attorney who engaged in in-person solicitation).
58
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
59
Id.
60
See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 n.12 (1983).
61
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
62
Id. at 561.
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son definition in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. Bolger remains
the only Supreme Court case to directly confront what, other than
64
In addressing
pure advertising, constitutes commercial speech.
whether pamphlets containing information about condoms, generally, and the defendant’s contraceptive products, specifically, were
commercial speech, the Supreme Court stated that:
The mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be advertisements clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are
commercial speech. Similarly, the reference to a specific product
does not by itself render the pamphlets commercial speech. Finally, the fact that Youngs has an economic motivation for
mailing the pamphlets would clearly be insufficient by itself to
turn the materials into commercial speech.
The combination of all these characteristics, however, provides
strong support for the . . . conclusion that the informational
65
pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial speech.

The Court concluded that the mailings were thus subject to the quali66
fied protection afforded commercial speech.
Bolger therefore acknowledged three characteristics of commer67
68
cial speech. First, it is a type of advertisement; second, it refers to a
69
specific product; and last, the speaker has an economic motivation
70
for the expression. The Court, however, was reluctant to provide a
distinct method for distinguishing between commercial and non71
commercial speech. Expressing no opinion as to whether reference
to a specific product or service is necessary to move expression into
the realm of commercial speech, the Court declined to suggest that
each of the characteristics set forth in Bolger must be present in order
72
The standard
to deem particular expression commercial speech.
for determining when speech moves from fully protected expression
into the less protected territory of commercial speech therefore re73
mains unclear.

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

463 U.S. 60 (1983).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, at § 11.3.7.2.
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67 (citations omitted).
Id. at 68.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67.
Id. at 68 n.14.
Id.
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B. The History of Governmental Protection and Regulation of
Commercial Speech
Examining the history of the protection and regulation of
commercial speech elucidates the uncertainty surrounding what constitutes commercial speech. Prior to 1975, the Supreme Court had
not interpreted the First Amendment to provide any protection for
74
The notion of protecting
speech deemed commercial in nature.
75
commercial speech was first introduced in Bigelow v. Virginia.
In
holding that the First Amendment protected newspaper advertisements for abortion services, the Court announced that the fact that
speech “had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s com76
mercial interests did not negate all First Amendment guarantees.”
Moreover, the Court observed that the “relationship of speech to the
marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in
77
the marketplace of ideas.” The Court, however, left unanswered the
extent to which the First Amendment allows regulation of advertising
78
related to activities properly regulated by the State.
A year later, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of
protecting commercial speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
79
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. The Court examined the constitutionality of a Virginia law that prohibited pharmacists from
80
advertising prescription drug prices. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Blackmun, acknowledged that “[i]f there is a right to adver81
tise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising,” and noted
that the First Amendment affords protection “to the communication,
82
to its source and to its recipients both.”
The Court began its analysis of whether the First Amendment
provides an exception for commercial speech by noting that speech,
such as a paid advertisement, does not lose First Amendment protec74

Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (upholding a law prohibiting
distribution of any advertising matter on any street); Breard v. City of Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (upholding a conviction for a violation of ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitations).
75
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
76
Id. at 818.
77
Id. at 825–26.
78
Id. at 825 (noting “[w]e need not decide in this case the precise extent to
which the First Amendment permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit”).
79
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
80
Id. at 763.
81
Id. at 757.
82
Id. at 756.
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tions merely because money is spent to convey it.
Further, the
Court reiterated that speech is protected despite being in forms such
84
as books or motion pictures that are sold for profit. Moreover, the
Court stated that the First Amendment protects speech even though
85
it may involve a solicitation to purchase, pay, or contribute money.
The Court also noted that even assuming the advertiser’s interest is
purely economic, the advertiser’s speech is not disqualified from re86
ceiving First Amendment protection. The Court further observed
that consumers on the receiving end likewise have a right to enjoy the
87
free flow of commercial information.
The Court also made note of the value of commercial speech in
88
a free enterprise economy, stating that the free flow of commercial
information was “indispensable” in creating an intelligent and well89
Further, the Court observed that the First
informed public.
Amendment makes the choice “between the dangers of suppressing
90
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available.”
Instead of paternalistically regulating advertising, the Court proposed
an approach less offensive to the First Amendment: assume that information is not inherently harmful; assume that well-informed
people will judge their own best interests; and assume it is better to
91
open the channels of communication than to close them.
In holding that commercial speech deserves First Amendment
protection, the Court noted that “[n]o one would contend that our
pharmacist may be prevented from being heard on the subject of
whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices should be regulated, or
92
their advertisement forbidden.” The Court recognized that speakers, recipients, and society in general benefit from the free flow of
93
ideas, including types of commercial speech.

83

Id.
Id. (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)).
85
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976).
86
Id. at 762 (observing that although the interests of the contestants in a labor
dispute are economic, the speech of both employees and employers enjoys First
Amendment protections).
87
Id. at 763.
88
Id. at 765.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 770.
91
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
92
Id. at 761–62.
93
Id. at 756, 764.
84
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Justice Stewart wrote a separate concurrence to explain how a
government that “has no power to restrict expression because of its
94
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content” can legitimately
95
regulate false and deceptive advertising.
Justice Stewart distinguished between pure commercial price and product advertising,
which the government can properly regulate, and ideological com96
munication, deserving full First Amendment protections.
Commercial price and product advertising, according to Justice Stewart, relates to tangible goods or services, and is confined to
97
promoting such specific goods and services. As the factual claims in
price and product advertising may be empirically tested, and consequently corrected to reflect the truth without restricting the free
dissemination of thought, this type of speech differs markedly from
98
ideological expression. The Justice stated:
Ideological expression, be it oral, literary, pictorial, or theatrical,
is integrally related to the exposition of thought—thought that
may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man. Although
such expression may convey factual information relevant to social
and individual decisionmaking, it is protected by the Constitution, whether or not it contains factual representations and even
if it includes inaccurate assertions of fact. Indeed, disregard of
the “truth” may be employed to give force to the underlying idea
99
expressed by the speaker.

Justice Rehnquist disagreed with Justice Stewart and the majority, and
noted in his dissent his view that commercial speech should not be
100
afforded any First Amendment protection.
In Justice Rehnquist’s
view, the First Amendment’s protections were “to relate to public decisionmaking as to political, social, and other public issues, rather
than the decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase
101
one or another kind of shampoo.”
Cases following Virginia State Board of Pharmacy explained that
the government’s power to regulate commerce justifies its power to
regulate commercial speech that is inextricably linked to commercial

94

Id. at 776 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
95
Id. at 776.
96
Id. at 779.
97
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 780 (Stewart, J., concurring).
98
Id. at 780–81.
99
Id. at 779–80.
100
Id. at 781–90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101
Id. at 787.
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102

transactions.
The commercial speech doctrine thus “represents an
accommodation between the right to speak and hear expression
about goods and services and the right of government to regulate the
103
sales of such goods and services.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has noted that the government retains less authority to curtail commercial speech when restrictions strike at “the substance of the
information communicated” rather than the “commercial aspect of
104
[the speech]—with offerors communicating offers to offerees.”
After the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment pro105
tected commercial speech, the Court addressed the extent to which
the government could regulate such speech in Central Hudson Gas &
106
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.
The issue in
Central Hudson was whether the New York Public Service Commission,
in order to conserve scarce fuel supplies, could order electric utilities
107
in the state to cease all advertising promoting the use of electricity.
The Court first acknowledged that commercial speech, defined as
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
108
109
and its audience,” is protected by the First Amendment. The majority then held that, in protecting the informational function of
advertising, it is constitutionally valid to suppress commercial mes110
sages that are “more likely to deceive the public than inform it,”
and, citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela111
tions, the Court stated that the government may ban “commercial
112
speech related to illegal activity.”
102

See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979) (holding that the prohibition of practicing optometry under a trade name violates the First Amendment’s
commercial speech protections); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457
(1978) (holding that a lawyer’s in-person client solicitation, while not entirely removed from the protection of the First Amendment, is analyzed under a lower level
of judicial scrutiny because it “is a business transaction in which speech is an essential
but subordinate component”).
103
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 903 (2d ed. 1988).
104
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (citing Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 n.28 (1977) (holding statute banning
advertisement of contraceptives unconstitutional).
105
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
106
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
107
Id. at 558.
108
Id. at 561.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 563 n.5 (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464–65 (1978)).
111
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
112
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
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The Court then adopted a four-part analysis for commercial
113
speech cases.
First, a court must determine whether the commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment; in other words, if it
114
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.
Next, a court must
determine “whether the asserted governmental interest is substan115
tial.” If answers to the previous questions are in the affirmative, the
majority announced, a court must then determine whether the restriction on speech directly advances the state interest involved, and,
finally, whether the regulation of the commercial speech is more ex116
tensive than necessary to serve the governmental interest. Applying
117
this analysis, essentially an intermediate scrutiny test, the Court determined that energy conservation, one of the state’s rationales for
regulating the utility companies’ truthful advertising, was a substantial interest that could be directly advanced by banning the
118
Under the fourth prong of the test, however, the
advertisements.
Court found that no showing had been made that the state’s interest
119
could not have been served by a less restrictive means.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, questioning whether
the restriction on the promotion of the use of electricity through ad120
vertising was truly a ban on exclusively commercial speech.
The
Justice reasoned that because commercial speech is afforded less protection than other forms of speech, the Court must not define
“commercial speech” too broadly “lest speech deserving of greater
121
constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed.”
Justice Stevens then noted that the Court’s definition of “commercial speech,”
as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
122
and its audience,” is unclear as to “whether the subject matter of
the speech or the motivation of the speaker [is] the limiting factor.”
According to Justice Stevens, either interpretation “encompasses
113

Id. at 566.
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (stating that under the intermediate scrutiny test, the government must assert a substantial state
interest in support of its regulation, demonstrate that the restriction directly and materially advances the interest, and the regulation must be narrowly drawn).
118
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568–69.
119
Id. at 570 (finding that “the energy conservation rationale, as important as it is,
cannot justify suppressing information about electric devices or services that would
cause no net increase in total energy use”).
120
Id. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring).
121
Id.
122
Id.
114
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speech that is entitled to the maximum protection afforded by the
123
The Justice supported his argument by observFirst Amendment.”
ing that neither a labor leader’s call for a strike “nor an economist’s
dissertation on the money supply should receive any lesser protection
because the subject matter concerns only the economic interests of
124
Similarly, the prospect of pecuniary reward for a
the audience.”
speaker should not result in the loss of First Amendment protections;
otherwise, speech found in newspapers, or made by paid public
speakers, professional authors, or political candidates with partial
125
economic motives would no longer enjoy full protection.
In addition, Justice Stevens noted that labeling all promotional advertising as
commercial speech, and limiting it as such, runs the risk of curtailing
“expression by an informed and interested group of persons of their
point of view on questions relating to [issues]... frequently discussed
126
Finally, Justice Stevens
and debated by our political leaders.”
opined that the justification for regulating the speech involved was
merely “the expressed fear that the audience may find the utility’s
127
message persuasive.”
The Central Hudson test has been regularly invoked in commer128
cial speech cases. Conflict exists, however, over whether the fourth
129
130
prong of the test remains applicable.

123

Id.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579–80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
125
Id. at 580 n.2.
126
Id. at 581.
127
Id.
128
See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (applying Central Hudson to restrictions on the advertising of compounded drugs); Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (applying Central Hudson to restrictions on
cigarette advertising); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S.
173 (1999) (applying Central Hudson to restrictions on the advertising of gambling);
44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (applying Central Hudson
to restrictions on a liquor advertisement); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995) (applying Central Hudson to restrictions on information on a beer label); Bd.
of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying Central Hudson
to restrictions on a Tupperware sales presentation).
129
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (announcing that the fourth prong determines whether means less restrictive than curtailing commercial speech can be used
to promote asserted governmental interest).
130
See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371 (imposing least-restrictive-means requirement);
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507 (imposing least-restrictive-means requirement); Rubin,
514 U.S. at 491 (imposing least-restrictive-means requirement). But see Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 188 (holding that the government is not required to
employ least-restrictive means possible, but the restriction must be narrowly tailored
to fit the asserted interest); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 418 n.13 (1993) (rejecting least-restrictive-means test for a reasonable-fit124

HALL 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

566

1/9/2006 6:19:09 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:551

While commercial speech is entitled to limited protection, the
Supreme Court, without offering an explanation, has repeatedly held
131
that the First Amendment does not protect advertising of illegality.
In 1973, two years before commercial speech was afforded any Constitutional protection, the Supreme Court decided the only case
132
addressing advertising of an illegal activity. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
133
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, the Court held that prohibiting the Pittsburgh Press from placing newspaper advertisements in
columns entitled “Jobs-Male Interest” and “Jobs-Female Interest” did
not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the Pittsburgh
134
Press. The Court stated that “[d]iscrimination in employment is not
only commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity . . . . We have
no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to
publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prosti135
Significantly, the Court noted that the advertisements
tutes.”
involved did not express a position on whether social policy called for
136
filling certain jobs with certain genders; nor, the Court observed,
did the advertisements criticize any ordinance or employment prac137
tice.
Inasmuch as the advertisements were no more than a
proposal of possible employment, the Court found that, they were
138
Therefore, the majority
“classic examples of commercial speech.”
held that prohibiting the Pittsburgh Press from placing advertisements
in gender-based columns did not violate the newspaper’s First
139
Amendment rights. The Court, however, emphasized that its holding in no way allowed the government to forbid the newspaper to
publish advertisements commenting on either the ordinance in140
Pittsburgh Press has since been
volved or on employment practices.
cited as establishing that the First Amendment does not protect the
advertising of illegal activities, and furthermore, such advertisements

between-ends-and-means analysis); Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (rejecting least-restrictivemeans requirement).
131
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, at § 11.3.7.4.
132
Id.
133
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
134
Id. at 391.
135
Id. at 388.
136
Id. at 385.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 385.
139
Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 391.
140
Id.
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may be prohibited, punished, and may even become the basis for civil
141
liability.
Therefore, political speech, receiving utmost First Amendment
protection, is subject only to a governmental restriction narrowly tai142
lored to serve an overriding state interest.
Restrictions on lessprotected commercial speech are subject to the intermediate scrutiny
143
test announced in Central Hudson; the advertisement of illegal ac144
Due
tivities, in contrast, receives no First Amendment protection.
to these varying levels of protection, the label the courts give speech
is paramount in determining the level of protection it receives—a
145
point illustrated by the cases surrounding The Federal Mafia.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT’S CASE AGAINST SCHIFF
On August 9, 2004, the Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary in146
junction issued by the United States District Court for the District
141

See, e.g., Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir.
1992) (holding the publisher of a magazine civilly liable after running an advertisement for an assassin that resulted in a murder committed by a person responding to
the ad).
142
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
143
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
144
Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 391.
145
See United States v. Schiff (Schiff II), 379 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Schiff (Schiff I), 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (D. Nev. 2003).
146
The injunction provides in relevant part that the defendants may not engage
in any of the following activities:
(1) Organizing, promoting, marketing or selling, or assisting in organizing, promoting, marketing or selling, any plan or arrangement
which advises or encourages taxpayers to attempt to violate internal revenue laws or unlawfully evade the assessment or collection
of their federal tax liabilities, including those that promote, sell, or
advocate the use of the “zero income” tax return, and the use of
false with-holding forms;
(2) Engaging in conduct subject to penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6700,
including organizing or selling a plan or arrangement and making
or furnishing a statement regarding the excludability of income
that they know or have reason to know is false or fraudulent as to
any material matter;
(3) Engaging in conduct subject to penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6700,
including organizing or selling a plan or arrangement and making
or furnishing a statement regarding the excludability of income
that they know or have reason to know is false or fraudulent as to
any material matter;
(4) Advertising, marketing or promoting any false, misleading, or deceptive tax position in any media for the purpose of advising or
encouraging taxpayers to unlawfully evade the assessment or payment of federal income taxes, including the positions that (1)
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147

of Nevada, prohibiting Irwin Schiff and his associates from selling
148
The injunction was issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
The Federal Mafia.
149
§ 7408, which authorizes an action to enjoin promoters of abusive
tax shelters from further engaging in conduct subject to penalty un150
151
der § 6700 (promoting abusive tax shelters) and § 6701 (aiding
persons can legally stop paying income taxes or become tax free by
using the plan or arrangement; (2) federal income tax is voluntary; (3) there is no law requiring anyone to pay income tax; (4)
there is no income tax, only a profits tax; (5) it is legal to report
zero income regardless of what you may have earned, or to use
false withholding forms; (6) Schiff’s personal services as witness or
brief writer will be materially helpful in defending criminal prosecution; or any other false, misleading, or deceptive tax position;
(5) Assisting others to violate the tax laws, including the evasion of assessment or payment of taxes;
(6) Inciting others to violate the tax laws, including the evasion of assessment and payment of taxes;
(7) Instructing or assisting others to hinder or disrupt the enforcement of internal revenue laws by filing frivolous lawsuits, taking
frivolous positions in an effort to impede IRS audits and Collection Due Process Hearings, or engaging in other conduct
intended to interfere with the administration and enforcement of
the internal revenue laws;
(8) Preparing or assisting in the preparation of any federal income tax
return for any other person;
(9) Engaging in conduct subject to penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6694
(preparing any part of a return or claim for refund that includes
an unrealistic position);
(10) Engaging in any conduct subject to penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6695
(failing to sign and furnish the correct identifying number on tax
returns they prepare); or
(11) Engaging in any other activity subject to injunction or penalty under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7407, 6694, or 6695, including fraudulent or
deceptive conduct that substantially interferes with the proper
administration of the internal revenue laws.
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 624–25.
147
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1284–85.
148
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 623.
149
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
150
26 U.S.C. § 6700(a) authorizes in part the imposition of a penalty on any person who:
(1)
(A) organizes (or assists in the organization of )—
(i) a partnership or other entity,
(ii) any investment plan or arrangement, or
(iii) any other plan or arrangement, or
(B) participates (directly or indirectly) in the sale of any interest
in an entity or plan or arrangement referred to in subparagraph
(A), and
(2) makes or furnishes or causes another person to make or furnish
(in connection with such organization or sale)—
(A) a statement with respect to the allowability of any deduction
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and abetting understatement of tax liability). The district court decided, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the government had carried
its burden of establishing a violation of § 6700 and that a preliminary
153
injunction was appropriate.
To establish a violation of § 6700, the United States must carry
the burden of showing that:
(1) the defendants organized or sold, or participated in the
organization or sale of an entity, plan, or arrangement;
(2) they made or caused to be made false or fraudulent
statements concerning the tax benefits to be derived
from the entity, plan, or arrangement;
(3) they knew or had reason to know that the statements
were false or fraudulent;
(4) the false or fraudulent statements pertained to a material
matter; and
(5) an injunction is necessary to prevent recurrence of this
154
conduct.
A. Schiff I, The District Court Opinion
1. Establishing a Violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 6700 and 6701
155

Written by Judge Lloyd George, the district court opinion first
recounted the government’s documentation of Schiff’s enterprise,
which includes selling books, tapes, and packages, marketing seminars and workshops, and performing letter-writing services and
or credit, the excludability of any income, or the securing of any
other tax benefit by reason of holding an interest in the entity
or participating in the plan or arrangement which the person
knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter, or
(B) a gross valuation overstatement as to any material matter.
26 U.S.C. § 6700(a) (2004); Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
151
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1264.
152
Id.
153
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 625. Factors the district court may consider in determining
whether an injunction is appropriate include:
(1) the gravity of the harm caused by the offense; (2) the extent of the
defendant’s participation; (3) the defendant’s degree of scienter; (4)
the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction; (5) the defendant’s
recognition (or non-recognition) of his own culpability; and (6) the
likelihood that the defendant’s occupation would place him in a position where future violations could be anticipated.
Id. (quoting United States v. Estate Pres. Servs., 202 F.3d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)).
154
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1266 (citing Estate Pres. Servs., 202 F.3d at 1093).
155
Id. at 1264.
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156

personal consultations for a fee.
The judge cited The Federal Mafia
as being “central” to Schiff’s “zero-income scheme,” and noted that
157
the book is included in each of the product packages Schiff sells.
Judge George observed that the book is “largely autobiographical,
containing in large part Schiff’s anti-tax and anti-government dia158
The judge further observed, however, that
tribes and theories.”
“[t]rue to its promise, The Federal Mafia contains specific instructions
on how to stop employers from withholding taxes by submitting an
159
Interest‘exempt’ W-4, and how to file ‘zero income’ tax returns.”
ingly, the judge noted that in The Federal Mafia, Schiff offers to send
readers, for no charge, an update of issues not fully developed in the
160
book.
The district court opinion then addressed the second and third
161
prongs of proving a § 6700 violation. Judge George noted that the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have repeatedly rejected
Schiff’s theories concerning the unconstitutionality of the income
162
Moreover, the judge, citing numerous legal battles Schiff has
tax.
fought, asserted that Schiff’s claim that paying taxes is voluntary is
163
164
“knowingly false.” Judge George quoted a Second Circuit case affirming an appeal from a summary judgment against Schiff, in which
the Second Circuit described Schiff as “an extremist who reserve[s]
the right to interpret the decisions of the Supreme Court as he
read[s] them from his layman’s point of view regardless of and
165
oblivious to the interpretations of the judiciary.”
As further support for the contention that Schiff knew or had
reason to know that his theories were false, the district court cited
cases involving individuals convicted of tax crimes after following
166
The district court included United States v. DenSchiff’s theories.
156

Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1267.
158
Id.
159
Id. (citing SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 154–68, 244–45, 274–75).
160
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1267–68 (citing SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 275).
161
Id. at 1268.
162
Id. (observing that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have repeatedly recognized the Sixteenth Amendment’s authority to impose a non-apportioned
direct income tax on United States citizens) (citations omitted).
163
Id. (citations omitted).
164
Schiff v. United States (Schiff), 919 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1990).
165
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 (quoting Schiff, 919 F.2d at 834) (rejecting
Schiff’s contention that the income tax violates the Constitution in an action brought
by Schiff seeking tax refunds on amounts collected by the government).
166
Id. at 1269–70 (citing United States v. Dentice, No. 99-50101, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30024 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999); United States v. Middleton, 246 F.3d 825 (6th
157
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167

tice in its list of cases. Although the district court stated that it was
citing Dentice as evidence of Schiff’s knowledge of the reception of his
theories and not for the propositions of the case, Judge George noted
parenthetically that in Dentice, the defendant’s good faith defense to a
tax crime was rejected in part because the court determined that the
“defendant could not reasonably rely on Schiff, who was neither a
CPA nor an attorney and had himself been convicted of tax eva168
The judge further observed that Schiff’s acknowledgment
sion.”
that people influenced by his works have gone to jail provides even
more support for the charge that Schiff knowingly made false or
169
fraudulent statements. Judge George went on to detail the “deceptive nature” of Schiff’s scheme by referring to Schiff’s suggestions in
The Federal Mafia that readers might avoid prosecution for falsely
claiming exempt status on a W-4 form by writing “under duress” next
170
to their signatures.
The district court decision next noted that Schiff’s statements,
having a substantial impact on the decision-making process of the
171
taxpayer, were material within the meaning of § 6700.
The court
then opined that an injunction was appropriate, as future § 6700 violations were likely and each element to prove a violation of § 6700
172
Before reaching the First Amendment issues, the
was present.
court stated that as the government had shown that Schiff and his associates had prepared false tax returns for their customers in
violation of § 6701, their tax preparation assistance was also subject to
173
the preliminary injunction.
2.

Asserting The Federal Mafia is Commercial Speech

Although the district court introduced its discussion of the First
Amendment issues involved in Schiff’s case by announcing that
Schiff’s “message is subject to injunction as false, misleading and deceptive commercial speech, incitement, and aiding and abetting
illegal conduct,” the bulk of the district court’s analysis focused on
174
commercial speech issues.
Further, although the Ninth Circuit acCir. 2001); United States v. Payne, 978 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Burdett, 962 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1992)).
167
Dentice, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30024.
168
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1269–70.
169
Id. at 1270.
170
Id. (citations omitted).
171
Id. at 1271.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 1271–72.
174
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.

HALL 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

572

1/9/2006 6:19:09 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:551

knowledged three theories by which the sale and publication of The
175
Federal Mafia could be enjoined, the court upheld the injunction as
an appropriate restriction on commercial speech and declined to address the issues of incitement or aiding and abetting criminal
176
activity.
The district court began its commercial speech discourse by acknowledging that while the Constitution accords less protection to
177
commercial speech, the bounds of commercial speech are unclear.
The court then noted that although “core” commercial speech “does
178
no more than propose a commercial transaction,” commercial
speech has also been defined more broadly as “expression related
179
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”
Judge George then mentioned in a footnote that the First Amend180
ment does not protect false commercial speech, and commercial
speech “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it” may be
181
banned. The judge then detailed the commercial speech aspects of
182
The district court listed as “core” commercial
Schiff’s “scheme.”
speech Schiff’s statements or suggestions that:
(1) persons can legally stop paying taxes, or become tax free
through the use of the scheme, (2) income tax is voluntary, or
that there is no law requiring anyone to pay income tax, (3) there
is no income tax, only a profits tax, (4) it is legal to report zero
income regardless of what you may have earned, and (5) it is legal
to stop the withholding of taxes by submitting an “exempt” W-4
183
form.

Judge George then attempted to illustrate how Schiff’s speech
could also be considered commercial speech under its broader definition—expression related solely to the economic interests of the
184
speaker and its audience.
The judge relied primarily on the Ninth
185
ObCircuit’s decision in United States v. Estate Preservation Services.
serving that “the importance of Estate Preservation to this court’s First
175

United States v. Schiff (Schiff II), 379 F.3d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 630.
177
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1272–73 (citations omitted).
178
Id. at 1273 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
179
Id. (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)).
180
Id. at 1273 n.6.
181
Id. at 1273 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771–72 n.24).
182
Id.
183
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
184
Id.
185
202 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2000).
176
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Amendment analysis cannot be overstated,” Judge George noted
that therein, the Ninth Circuit had affirmed an injunction against the
organizers and promoters of Estate Preservation Services for violating
§ 6700 in the marketing of trusts and other asset protection devices
187
that were essentially abusive tax shelters. Judge George pointed out
that like Schiff, Robert L. Henkell, the central figure organizing and
promoting Estate Preservation Services, conducted seminars through
188
which he advised customers how to create and use the trusts. Henkell also published a training manual containing “numerous
representations about the permissibility of tax deductions and credits
189
The Estate Preservation court,
purportedly available to [the trusts].”
applying the broader definition of commercial speech, rejected a
First Amendment challenge and enjoined the defendants from promoting, marketing, or selling the trusts or any other abusive tax
190
In so doing, the court in Estate Preservation relied on
shelter plan.
191
previous cases that had used the “relating solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience” definition of commercial
speech to enjoin the promoters of asset-management kits from fur192
ther distributing their materials.
Drawing parallels to Estate Preservation and the cases it drew
upon, Judge George applied a commercial speech standard to
Schiff’s expression, involving not only the advertising, but also “the
193
promoting, marketing or selling of the scheme.” The court, noting
194
Schiff’s “sophistication and education in tax matters,” also found
that “to the extent Schiff holds himself out to be a tax consultant, familiar with the taxing system, . . . the promotion, marketing and sales
of the scheme involves the offering of fraudulent tax advice, and is
195
not protected by the First Amendment.”
The district court then considered whether banning The Federal
196
Mafia constituted an impermissible prior restraint on speech. First,
186

Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d. at 1273 n.7.
Id. at 1274.
188
Id.
189
Id. (quoting United States v. Estate Pres. Servs., 202 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir.
2000).
190
Id. at 1274–75.
191
United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. White,
769 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1985).
192
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1275 (citing Estate Pres. Servs., 202 F.3d at 1093).
193
Id. at 1276.
194
Id. at 1276 n.10.
195
Id. at 1276.
196
Id. at 1276–77.
187
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Judge George addressed whether the book qualifies as commercial
197
As The Federal Mafia includes descriptions along with the
speech.
prices of other books, cassettes, and audio reports by Schiff, the judge
concluded that the book fit the core definition of commercial
198
The judge further opined that although the book comspeech.
ments on public issues, doing so “does not elevate speech from
199
commercial to political rank.”
In addition, Judge George asserted
that Schiff could “publish his ideology or comment on matters of
public concern without advertising his tax scheme;” therefore, the
judge stated, the commercial speech components of the book are not
200
The judge
“inextricably intertwined” with its protected speech.
cited the fact that The Federal Mafia is marketed as part of Schiff’s “instructional packages” as further evidence of the commercial nature of
201
Judge George identified the “training-manual characterthe book.
istics of the book (including instructions and materials regarding the
false filings of zero returns and submissions of W-4s)” as furthering
202
The Federal Mafia,
the promotion of Schiff’s “overall tax scheme.”
the court stated, promotes the use of this “scheme” for Schiff’s profit
and therefore constitutes “commercial speech not shielded by the
203
In support of this contention, Judge George
First Amendment.”
stated:
The book does not provide information or advocacy on tax reform in general, and then leave the reader to act on his own
judgment, or consider the advice of legitimate tax professionals
before engaging in conduct of legal significance. Rather, it is part
of the effort to sell for profit Schiff’s materials and services. In
this regard, The Federal Mafia hardly stands alone, but by its very
essence is closely connected to the scheme expressly and finan204
cially.

The judge then reiterated that the government may ban the distribution of a publication even though it contains a combination of
205
protected and unprotected speech.
Finally, the district court concluded that the “commercial speech and tax advice aspects of the

197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Id. at 1277.
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1278.
Id.
Id.
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. at 1279.
Id.
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scheme (including those contained in The Federal Mafia) can be en206
joined to the extent that they are false, misleading or deceptive.”
B. Schiff II, The Ninth Circuit Decision
Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit began its commercial
speech discussion by acknowledging the vagueness of the definition
207
of commercial speech. The opinion, written by Judge Procter Hug,
Jr., noted that if The Federal Mafia is considered commercial speech,
208
The judge then summarily
the Central Hudson test is implicated.
stated that Schiff would lose on the first prong of the test, which gives
the government the right to regulate false, misleading, or deceptive
209
The court acknowledged, however, that if the
commercial speech.
contested portions of the book were considered political speech, they
210
would be entitled to greater protection.
The court noted that commercial speech, under the narrower
definition urged by Schiff, is present on the back cover of The Federal
Mafia and in inserts which list other products made available by
211
Schiff.
Concerning the broader definition of commercial speech
urged by the government, the court observed:
Although neither the government nor the district court, which
adopted the government’s definition of commercial speech, specifically states which pages would meet this broad definition of
commercial speech, it can be assumed the government believes
that, at least, Chapter Eight (“How to Stop Paying Income Taxes”)
and the Epilogue and Addendum to the Second Edition (which
give instructions on how to file the “zero-income” returns and
samples of such returns) would qualify as commercial speech un212
der this definition.

To clarify the definition of commercial speech and to shed light
upon what the Supreme Court meant by “expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience,” the court referred to two recent Ninth Circuit commercial speech cases, Mattel,
213
214
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. and Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.

206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

Id. at 1279–80.
United States v. Schiff (Schiff II), 379 F.3d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 627.
296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
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The court noted that Mattel and Hoffman involved intellectual
property challenges in which a speaker had used pre-existing images
215
to create a new expressive work with commercial aspects. Although
the courts in those cases held that the commercial speech within the
new works was “inextricably entwined” with expressive speech and
thus entitled to full First Amendment protection, the Schiff court
216
found the case at hand to be “markedly different.”
The court asserted that “[i]nstead of using an iconic figure of
Americana to lampoon American culture, Schiff has created an entire
line of tax avoidance products and services, of which The Federal Mafia
217
The court continued: “The extravagant claims
is the linchpin.”
made in The Federal Mafia are designed to convince readers that they
can lawfully avoid paying their income taxes so that the readers will
218
buy other products in Schiff’s line.” As support for this contention,
the court cited examples from the book, including an insert entitled
219
“From the Desk of Irwin Schiff.”
The insert states that the book
now contains new, previously unavailable information concerning
220
zero income tax returns and refunds. This insert, the court opined,
along with the flyleaf of the book discussing the illegality of income
taxes, is “made to assure the taxpayer that the taxpayer can legiti221
The Ninth Circuit
mately follow these suggestions and forms.”
cited the page listing Schiff’s other products and their prices, as well
as excerpts taken from Schiff’s website, as further evidence that The
Federal Mafia is “an integral part of Schiff’s whole program to market
his various products for taxpayers to utilize his forms and techniques
222
to avoid paying income tax.”
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the district court’s reliance on
Estate Preservation and noted Schiff’s counterargument that his case is
distinguishable because the book enjoined in Estate Preservation con223
Judge Hug observed that the book
tained no political speech.

215

United States v. Schiff (Schiff II), 379 F.3d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 2004). In Mattel, a
pop group had used the image of Barbie to create a song parodying American culture. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 899. Hoffman involved a magazine’s use of digitally altered
images, including one of Dustin Hoffman, to showcase spring fashions. Hoffman, 255
F.3d at 1183.
216
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 627.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 628.
222
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 628–29.
223
Id. at 629.
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involved in Estate Preservation was an instruction manual for tax evasion entitled “Asset Preservation Trusts (APT)–Description, Use &
224
The judge further noted that the defendants in Estate
Benefits.”
Preservation made no claims that the manual did anything except de225
scribe the use and benefits of the trusts.
The court nevertheless
found that The Federal Mafia could be likened to the training manual
since it “is acting as an advertisement for Schiff’s full range of tax226
avoidance products and services.”
An advertisement, the court reasoned, is commercial speech,
227
and commercial speech may be enjoined when it is fraudulent.
The court explained that “[a]n advertisement is fraudulent when it
228
misleads customers about the benefit of the offered product.”
Illi229
nois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc. was offered as an
230
Judge Hug compared Schiff’s case to Madigan, in which
example.
the defendants, a for-profit fundraising company, told customers that
a “significant amount” of each dollar donated would be given to char231
The
ity when in fact only fifteen cents per dollar were donated.
Ninth Circuit stated that Schiff is making “similarly fraudulent
claims” by informing readers that “no law requires you to file income
tax returns” and indicating that there is no law authorizing federal
232
courts to prosecute anyone for income tax crimes.
The court then
concluded: “Although these claims are far-fetched, they could mislead a customer into believing that he or she could use Schiff’s
products to legally stop paying income taxes. Given the risk of consumer confusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
233
it enjoined The Federal Mafia.”
Thus, the district court and the circuit court found that The Federal Mafia fit both the narrower and the broader meanings of
234
commercial speech. Furthermore, both courts relied on Estate Preservation in concluding that Schiff could be enjoined from distributing

224

Id.
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 630.
228
Schiff II, 379 F.2d at 630.
229
538 U.S. 600 (2003).
230
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 630.
231
Id. (citing Madigan, 538 U.S. at 606–09).
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Schiff II, 379 F.2d at 626–27; United States v. Schiff (Schiff I), 269 F. Supp. 2d
1262, 1274 (D. Nev. 2003).
225
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235

The Federal Mafia. Finally, the courts held that as the fully protected
portions of Schiff’s book were extricable from the parts considered by
the courts to be commercial speech, Schiff was properly prohibited
236
from selling The Federal Mafia.
V. THE FEDERAL MAFIA IS POLITICAL, NOT COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit correctly acknowledged that the standards for defining commercial speech are
237
vague. The standards are in fact ambiguous, and courts have relied
on “the ‘common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a
238
Comcommercial transaction . . . and other varieties of speech.”
mon sense, however, indicates that a three-hundred page book
criticizing the policies and practices of the government and urging
239
As Justice Stevens warned in
reform qualifies as political speech.
Central Hudson, courts must not define commercial speech too
broadly “lest speech deserving of greater constitutional protection be
240
inadvertently suppressed.” Despite this caveat, the “common sense”
of the courts hearing Schiff’s case led them to conclude incorrectly
that The Federal Mafia was not a political diatribe entitled to full First
Amendment protection, but rather commercial speech that can be
241
regulated and should be suppressed.
First, The Federal Mafia does not qualify as commercial speech
242
under Bolger, the only case directly addressing the characteristics of
243
The Court in Bolger determined that the pamcommercial speech.
phlets in question were commercial speech because the author
conceded that they were advertisements, they referred to a specific
product, and the author had an economic motive for distributing
244
them. Schiff, however, has never conceded that The Federal Mafia is
245
an advertisement, and the courts offered a weak explanation as to

235

Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 629; Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 629; Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
237
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 626; Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
238
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978).
239
See SCHIFF, supra note 2.
240
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
579 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
241
See Schiff II, 379 F.3d 621; Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262.
242
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983).
243
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, at § 11.3.7.2.
244
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67.
245
See Schiff II, 379 F.3d 621; Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262.
236
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how Schiff’s lengthy book can be likened to a promotional pamphlet
246
or a poster announcing a product and its price.
The Ninth Circuit attempted to show that The Federal Mafia is
part of an advertising scheme for Schiff’s other products by including
several excerpts from Schiff’s website that discuss the book in con247
junction with other works by Schiff.
The court, however, failed to
explain how the website advertisements for The Federal Mafia prove
248
that the book itself is an advertisement for Schiff’s other products.
Including quotes from advertisements for The Federal Mafia in the discussion of whether The Federal Mafia is itself commercial speech only
clouded the First Amendment issue surrounding the banning of the
249
book.
In order to label The Federal Mafia commercial speech under Bolger, the district court and the Ninth Circuit also emphasized that the
250
book is sold for profit and refers to and lists other products. Under
this rationale, however, virtually any newspaper or any nonfiction
book or novel that lists works by the same author or publisher could
be labeled and potentially regulated as commercial speech, a result
that hardly seems consistent with the freedom of speech embedded
251
in the First Amendment.
Additionally, however, the district court and the circuit court
surprisingly found that aspects of The Federal Mafia qualified as commercial speech under the narrower definition of the term—
252
“advertising pure and simple,” or speech that “does no more than
253
propose a commercial transaction.”
The district court stretched
this straightforward definition by declaring without explanation that
Schiff’s contention that income tax is voluntary and his promotion of
a theory in which he suggested that one may stop the withholding of
taxes by submitting an “exempt” W-4 form constituted “core” com254
These tax theories plainly do not fall into the
mercial speech.
straightforward realm of price and product advertising contemplated
by the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy or Bolger, and
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged as much by admitting that only the

246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254

See Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 629; Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 628–29.
See id.
See id.
See Schiff II, 379 F.3d 621; Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 626 (citation omitted).
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1274.
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back cover and inserts in The Federal Mafia would qualify as commer255
cial speech under its narrower definition. It is highly questionable,
however, that even these pages, which do list price and product information, move The Federal Mafia into the commercial speech
category.
Newspapers and magazines containing advertisements are often
sold for profit, but they have not been and should not be regulated as
commercial speech. Furthermore, many books, including works of
fiction and nonfiction, advertise other books by the same author or
publisher on the first or last few pages of the book. It is difficult to
imagine a scenario in which the government successfully labels a
novel “commercial speech” in order to regulate its contents. Although other books and products by Schiff, and even the Internal
Revenue Code itself is advertised for sale on the last pages of The Federal Mafia, it hardly seems that this alone is enough to categorize the
entire three-hundred page book as an advertisement for Schiff’s
256
“scheme.”
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the few pages listing Schiff’s
other products and their prices were not inextricably entwined with
The Federal Mafia and therefore the book, despite hundreds of pages
of commentary on the government, could not be protected as politi257
Citing Mattel and Hoffman, the court attempted to use
cal speech.
these intellectual property cases to explain how the advertisements in
258
The Federal Mafia allow the government to ban the book. The court
reiterated that the song “Barbie Girl” and a digitally altered picture of
Dustin Hoffman, at issue in Mattel and Hoffman, contained elements
of commercial speech and expressive speech that could not be separated, hence the speech was entitled to full First Amendment
259
protection.
The court appropriately distinguished those works
from The Federal Mafia by pointing out that in his book, Schiff is not
“using an iconic figure of Americana to lampoon American cul260
While that is true enough, Schiff is in fact doing something
ture.”
much more thought-provoking and also much more deserving of
First Amendment protection: criticizing the American government.
That point notwithstanding, the court proceeded to explain that
“Schiff can relate his long history with the IRS and explain his unor255
256
257
258
259
260

Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 626.
SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 319–20.
Schiff II, 379 F.3d at 627–29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 627.
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thodox tax theories without simultaneously urging his readers to buy
his products . . . . Schiff cannot use the protected portions of The Federal Mafia to piggy-back his fraudulent commercial speech into full
261
It seems easier to comprehend the
First Amendment protection.”
situation in reverse, however, to argue that the government cannot
use the few pages of advertising at the end of a three-hundred page
book to piggy-back the protected political speech of The Federal Mafia
into the less-protected category of commercial speech.
In addition to finding that The Federal Mafia fit the narrow definition of commercial speech, the district court and the Ninth Circuit
found that the book also fit into the broader definition of commer262
cial speech: “expression related solely to the economic interests of
263
the speaker and its audience.” As Justice Stevens pointed out in his
concurrence in Central Hudson, however, the mere fact that speech
relates to money or the economy hardly renders its First Amendment
264
protections diminished. Just as an “economist’s dissertation on the
money supply” is entitled to full First Amendment protection, Schiff’s
critique of the government’s tax policy and the IRS should similarly
enjoy protection, and should certainly not lose any protection due to
the simple fact that taxes relate to the economic interest of most
265
Americans.
Moreover, even if the “related solely to the economic interests of
266
the speaker and its audience” definition of commercial speech is
interpreted as referring not to the subject matter of the speech, but
rather to the motivation of the speaker, The Federal Mafia still cannot
be properly labeled commercial speech. Adopting such an interpretation, as Justice Stevens noted in Central Hudson, would allow only
qualified First Amendment protection to the work of any professional
267
If the courts in Schiff’s case
author with partial economic motives.
adopted this definition of commercial speech, producing the absurd
result of subjecting almost any book, newspaper, or magazine sold for
profit to the restrictions imposed on commercial speech, the question still exists as to whether Schiff’s motivation in selling The Federal

261

Id. at 629.
See id. at 629–30; see also United States v. Schiff (Schiff I), 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262,
1277 (D. Nev. 2003).
263
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980).
264
See id. at 579–80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
265
See id. at 580.
266
See, e.g., id. at 561 (majority opinion).
267
Id. at 580 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
262
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268

Mafia is truly economic. Schiff offers to send readers additional in269
Additionally, as Judge George pointed out in
formation for free.
the district court opinion, in The Federal Mafia, Schiff offers to send
readers an updated attachment citing court decisions, statutes, and
270
A speaker solely trying to make a
other resources free of charge.
profit, without regard to urging political change, is unlikely to offer
such information for free. Schiff not only offers readers free information on filing tax returns, he also offers free transcripts of court
271
A speaker solely concerned
proceedings in which he was a party.
with his own economic interest and seeking profit through tricking
the public into following a fraudulent tax scheme is even less likely to
offer free transcripts of hearings in which the speaker himself was
272
convicted of tax evasion.
Perhaps attempting to overcome strong evidence indicating that
The Federal Mafia does not fit into the broader definition of commercial speech, the district court and the Ninth Circuit compared Schiff’s
273
There
book to the training manual banned in Estate Preservation.
are key differences, however, between the material banned in Estate
274
Preservation and the material banned in The Federal Mafia.
Estate Preservation Services was a business organized to market
trusts and other “asset preservation devices” through a nationwide,
275
multi-level network of financial planners.
A newsletter described
the trusts “as the perfect way for your client to warehouse wealth” and
as a “safety net” that could provide employment to donors and their
276
In Estate Preservation, the Ninth Circuit upheld an injuncfamilies.
tion enacted under the same statutes and similar in scope to the
277
injunction prohibiting Schiff from distributing The Federal Mafia.
Under the injunction, the organizers were enjoined from distributing
a training manual entitled “Asset Preservation Trusts (APT)–
278
Description, Use & Benefits.” The Estate Preservation court, quoting
268

See SCHIFF, supra note 2.
See, e.g, id. at 205, 211.
270
United States v. Schiff (Schiff I), 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267–68 (D. Nev. 2003).
271
See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 211 n.1.
272
See id.
273
United States v. Schiff (Schiff II), 379 F.3d 621, 629–30 (9th Cir. 2004); Schiff I,
269 F. Supp. 2d at 1273–74.
274
See SCHIFF, supra note 2; see also United States v. Estate Pres. Servs., 202 F.3d
1093, 1097–1103 (9th Cir. 2000).
275
Estate Pres. Servs., 202 F.3d at 1097.
276
Id. at 1102.
277
Id. at 1097.
278
Id.
269
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279

United States v. Buttorff, upholding a similar injunction enacted under the same statutes, dismissed the First Amendment argument in
one paragraph, declaring: “Where it has been determined that [a
promoter’s] statements regarding the tax benefits of his trust, which
constitute commercial speech, are misleading in the context contemplated by Congress in enacting the statute . . . such representations
280
The Estate Preservation
are not protected by the First Amendment.”
court failed to mention that the defendant in Buttorff conceded that
281
In addition, the
he was engaged in commercial speech for profit.
Estate Preservation opinion never mentions political speech as being
part of the training manual, most likely because the manual con282
tained no political speech.
The manual thus lies in sharp contrast to The Federal Mafia,
which contains colorful criticism and commentary on the United
283
States government. For example, in describing a government study
approximating tax revenue lost because of people who avoid paying
taxes on income derived from crime, Schiff writes: “True to its mafia
character, the federal government believes that it is entitled to a cut
from everyone’s action—even your neighborhood mugger, pimp and
284
hooker.” Schiff also provides extensive criticism of the judiciary. In
relating a story of one of his trials, he states:
The public undoubtedly associates all trials (especially those in
lofty federal courts) as careful and conscientious efforts to arrive
at true and just verdicts. The public hardly associates trials in federal courts with those often depicted in melodramatic westerns;
where the judge is beholdin’ to the local cattle baron, whose grip
on the town is threatened by the defendant. Nor does the public
associate such trials with those often depicted as taking place in
the deep South with roughly the same cast of characters—but
with different accents. But such trials (also with different accents)
do take place in federal courts—as my trial and those of many
285
others prove!

Far from using The Federal Mafia as an instruction manual on how to
286
avoid taxes, Schiff utilizes it to call for political change. Writing the

279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286

761 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1985).
Estate Pres. Servs., 202 F.3d at 1106 (emphasis added).
Buttorff, 761 F.2d at 1066.
See Estate Pres. Servs., 202 F.3d at 1096–1105.
SCHIFF, supra note 2.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
See, e.g., id. at 268.
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Epilogue from jail, where he was imprisoned for criminal tax fraud,
Schiff urges readers to call for a change in the system:
It is also clear to me that the release of this book is probably my
only hope of getting out of jail in the immediate future, and is, I
am sure, my only real hope of ever getting a lawless and vengeful
government off my back. Obviously I am innocent of any wrongdoing, but this has not stopped the government from imprisoning
me for over 24 months before, six months now (as of this writing),
and for as many more months as they will try to get away with in
the future . . . . My only hope is that this book will make a broad
and significant public impact and elicit some kind of public out287
cry.

Schiff then urges readers to get a copy of the book to their congressmen and senators, especially members of the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees, as they oversee the legal system Schiff believes
288
is so corrupt.
Despite these instances of core political speech in The Federal Mafia, conspicuously absent in the Estate Preservation Services manual,
the Ninth Circuit, like the district court, was nonetheless “persuaded
that Estate Preservation Services is applicable here because The Federal
Mafia is acting as an advertisement for Schiff’s full range of tax289
avoidance products and services.”
The Ninth Circuit, however, attempted to lend further support to the district court’s contention
that The Federal Mafia fit the broader definition of commercial speech
because of its similarity to Estate Preservation Services. Judge Hug
wrote:
Although neither the government nor the district court, which
adopted the government’s definition of commercial speech, specifically states which pages would meet this broad definition of
commercial speech, it can be assumed the government believes
that, at least, Chapter Eight (“How to Stop Paying Income Taxes”)
and the Epilogue and Addendum to the Second Edition (which
give instructions on how to file the “zero-income” returns and
samples of such returns) would qualify as commercial speech un290
der this definition.

Examining Chapter Eight and the instructions and samples in the
context of The Federal Mafia, however, only casts more doubt on the

287
288
289
290

See, e.g., id. at 256
Id.
United States v. Schiff (Schiff II), 379 F.3d 621, 629 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 627.
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conclusion that the book fits the broader definition of commercial
291
speech.
Chapter Eight begins with a quote attributed to Woodrow Wilson: “The history of liberty is the history of the limitation of
292
governmental power, not the increase of it.”
In the opening paragraph of the chapter, Schiff reiterates his view that the IRS, knowing
that a compulsory income tax would violate the Constitution, has
293
Thus,
based the income tax on a system of voluntary compliance.
Schiff opines, the government has tricked taxpayers into believing
they must pay a voluntary income tax, because the government knows
294
Schiff
that a mandatory income tax system is unconstitutional.
then asks, in the second paragraph of Chapter Eight: “Overlooking
the lawless responses the government is capable of making, how can
295
Americans stop paying a tax for which they have no legal liability?”
This question once again alerts the reader that although Schiff
wholeheartedly believes his interpretation of the law is correct, the
government disagrees and is capable of taking “lawless” action against
296
citizens following Schiff’s advice.
Much of the chapter does contain Schiff’s advice on how, under
297
the law as he interprets it, one may avoid paying income tax. Chapter Eight contains excerpts from the Internal Revenue Code and
sample IRS forms, and describes in detail how Schiff believes a taxpayer can respond to these forms to avoid paying taxes that, in
298
Schiff’s view, he or she does not owe. It is clear, though, that Chapter Eight is not merely an instruction manual designed to dupe the
public into thinking they may legally save money by avoiding taxes.
The chapter instead provides support, based in the tax code and
299
forms, for Schiff’s unorthodox tax theories. Rather than summarily
stating that the government and the IRS know that income taxes are
voluntary, an unconventional view that few readers would likely adopt
without proof, Schiff attempts to give credence to his theory by pointing out ways readers can interpret the code and tax forms to arrive at
the same conclusions he has concerning the voluntary nature of the
income tax. Unlike a manual describing a trust scheme as a way to
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299

See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 154–68.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 154–68.
Id.
Id.
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save and create wealth, Chapter Eight warns readers of the pitfalls,
including fines and imprisonment, of filing a “zero-income” tax re300
Schiff simultaneously tries to convince readers that the
turn.
income tax is unconstitutional while informing them of the consequences they could face for acting on his theories:
However, the “law” provides what might be considered “liability”
traps for those who allegedly “must” withhold. So, such organizations and persons are advised to check out the “law” for
themselves, though I will present enough of it to convince anyone
301
that legally, no one is really required to take any notice of it.

Therefore, The Federal Mafia, filled with political speech even in the
chapter most akin to an “instruction manual,” cannot be equated
with the manual distributed in Estate Preservation Services.
The content of The Federal Mafia thus is not related solely to the
economic interest of the speaker and its audience, as in the case of a
training manual detailing how to set up a trust. Instead, The Federal
Mafia is speech relating the interest Schiff has, and believes readers
have, in exposing a government he feels is rife with corruption.
Schiff’s contention with the United States government happens to
concern income taxes, a topic related to the economic interest of
most Americans.
The Federal Mafia thus is not commercial speech under either its
narrower or broader definition. Additionally, the Court’s justifications for regulating commercial speech, while certainly valid, do not
support banning the sale of The Federal Mafia. Commercial speech
has long been considered less worthy of full First Amendment protection than political speech because the government need not tolerate
inaccuracies in objective, factual commercial speech as it tolerates
302
false assertions in political commentary.
Schiff’s book is far from
objective, but is rather a biased, anti-government rant, more akin to a
political commentary than a poster depicting a product and a price.
Courts also treat commercial speech differently than political speech
because, “[s]ince advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation
303
and forgone entirely.” After reading an account of Schiff’s ongoing
304
court battles and learning of his unpleasant experiences in prison,
300

Id. at 157.
Id. at 161.
302
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 (1976).
303
Id. at 772 n.24.
304
SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 239–57.
301
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as well as learning of the government’s unwilling reception of his
theories and his book, it is incongruous to assume that others will relay Schiff’s message in order to make a profit. Schiff’s speech is thus
not durable or hardy; instead, the suppression of The Federal Mafia
may effectively silence Schiff’s message.
Therefore, it is apparent that The Federal Mafia falls more clearly
into the realm of political speech. A major purpose of the First
Amendment is to protect discussion of governmental affairs, and to
305
promote debate and the free exchange of ideas. The Court in Pittsburgh Press, while forbidding a newspaper advertisement for an illegal
activity, emphasized that nothing in its holding allowed the government to prohibit the newspaper from publishing or distributing
advertisements commenting on or criticizing any ordinance or prac306
tice. Similarly, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy stressed
that nothing would prevent the pharmacist, whose advertisements
were at issue, from being heard on the topics of regulating pharma307
Schiff’s
ceutical prices or allowing pharmaceutical advertising.
book is unlike a help-wanted ad in a newspaper or a poster advertising prescription drugs, as The Federal Mafia consists almost entirely of
comments and criticisms of the government’s statutes and practices
involving taxes in general. If the First Amendment truly was designed
to protect political and social decision-making, “rather than the decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or
308
another kind of shampoo,” The Federal Mafia illustrates exactly the
type of speech the Court sought to protect in Pittsburgh Press and Vir309
Even more importantly, the essential
ginia State Board of Pharmacy.
goal of the First Amendment is to protect the right to criticize the
310
government.
Criticism of the government potentially creates unrest and dissatisfaction, which in turn leads to social and political
311
change.
It is apparent that condemning the government in the
hope of generating change is exactly the purpose Schiff contem312
plated in writing The Federal Mafia.
305

Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391
(1973).
307
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761–62.
308
Id. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
309
See id. at 761–62 (majority opinion); Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 391.
310
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
311
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
312
See, e.g., SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 256 (urging readers to contact legislators concerning the unconstitutionality of income tax).
306
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Unfortunately, however, the high value of free speech often
313
leads those in power to seek to suppress it, and speech is often silenced due to “the expressed fear that the audience may find the
314
[speaker’s] message persuasive.”
The ability to speak freely is
needed least in instances involving an ineffective speaker relating a
powerless message to an apathetic audience; free speech is most
needed when an effective speaker with an urgent, controversial mes315
316
Schiff is such a speaker.
sage finds an audience willing to listen.
The government’s effort to ban The Federal Mafia merely suggests the
government’s apprehension that citizens will call for change, or,
317
worse yet, will follow Schiff’s path of civil disobedience.
Assuming informed people will judge their own best interests,
the First Amendment makes the choice between the dangers of sup318
pressing information and the dangers of its potential misuse. Schiff
clearly alerts readers to the possible consequences of following his
advice and adopting his ideas; in fact, he describes in detail his time
319
spent in prison. As the district court pointed out, Schiff is neither a
320
CPA nor a tax attorney, but rather a convicted felon. Instead of allowing readers to take this information into account and form their
own opinion of Schiff’s theories, the government has stretched the
bounds of the commercial speech doctrine beyond recognition in an
attempt to silence Irwin Schiff.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Mafia is not commercial speech; instead the book is
political speech entitled to full First Amendment protection. The
lengthy volume fits no definition of commercial speech and cannot
be likened to promotional pamphlets or training manuals properly
313

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 581 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
315
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (citation
omitted).
316
See United States v. Schiff (Schiff I), 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268 (D. Nev. 2003)
(noting IRS information indicates that almost 5,000 tax returns were filed by nearly
3,100 of Schiff’s customers from 2000–2003). See also SCHIFF, supra note 2, at front
cover (claiming over 90,000 copies of The Federal Mafia sold).
317
See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 257. Schiff’s claim that while he was in transit between correctional facilities, the government “lost” his documents relating to The
Federal Mafia bolsters this contention. Id.
318
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
769–70 (1976).
319
See, e.g., SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 239–57.
320
Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1268–70.
314
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321

regulated as such.
Instead, The Federal Mafia so convincingly criticizes the practices of the government of the United States, that the
government has regulated Schiff’s book under the guise of protecting
the public from deceptive commercial speech, rather than providing
Schiff’s speech with the full First Amendment protection it de322
serves.
Schiff’s tax views may be completely invalid, and his arguments
323
He admits and in fact provides readers with demay be frivolous.
tails of the various ways the government has rejected his claims
throughout the years. If Schiff is a fool, however, “the best thing to
do is to encourage him to advertise the fact by speaking . . . [because]
324
it is by the exposure of folly that it is defeated.”
Perhaps Schiff is
not a fool, but in an effort to convince readers of his sincere distrust
of the American government, he may have stretched the truth or
325
even spoken falsely of our government and its agencies. The Federal
Mafia is still safe, as “[u]nder the First Amendment, there is no such
thing as a false idea,” and the only way that ideas can be suppressed is
326
Perhaps, though, there
through “the competition of other ideas.”
is some truth to Schiff’s theories on tax and government, and banning The Federal Mafia embodies “the expressed fear that the
327
With the
audience may find the [speaker’s] message persuasive.”
328
national debt currently over eight trillion dollars, there could
hardly be a less appropriate time for Americans to find persuasive a
theory questioning the government’s authority to collect income tax.

321

Id.
See SCHIFF, supra note 2; United States v. Schiff (Schiff II), 379 F.3d 621 (9th Cir.
2004); Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262.
323
See, e.g., Schiff I, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 (observing that the right of Congress
to impose income tax cannot be doubted; further, income tax is constitutional) (citations omitted).
324
President Woodrow Wilson, Address at the Institute of France, Paris (May 10,
1919), in 2 SELECTED LITERARY AND POLITICAL PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF WOODROW
WILSON 330, 333 (Grosset & Dunlap).
325
See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 162 (Asserting under the heading “Camels, Being
Ducks, Can Fly,” that “[i]n order to create a legal basis for all forms of ‘backup withholding,’ the government makes a claim no more rational than the one stated
above.”).
326
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
780 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 339–40 (1974)).
327
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
581(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
328
On January 6, 2006 (08:23:29 PM GMT), the ever-rising U.S. National Debt
Clock placed the national debt at $8,210,458,331,965.02. U.S. National Debt Clock,
available at http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
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